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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issue of automation coverage for costs in the event of 
damage caused by an automated decision-making process. It will consider civil liability 
and insurance from the point of view of problems related to the proof of a causal nexus 
between wrongdoing and losses. Starting from a study on causation, this paper focuses 
on liability and insurance in case of automation: their changing role in an automated 
world and various perspectives taking also into account recent European perspectives 
and developments.  
The thesis that the paper proposes is that legal liability is not a sufficient instrument to 
permit effective prevention and compensation in the case of damage caused by full 
algorithmic automation. This is particularly so because it could be not always possible to 
trace back to a specific human actor, as the European Commission underscored in its 
recommendation on civil law rules on robotics (2015/2103(INL)). Of course, legislators 
can intervene by reshaping the civil liability, for instance, by eliminating the proof of causal 
link or introducing new forms of strict liability. We intend to propose an alternative/ 
complementary way considering the role of insurance system, particularly liability 
insurance, which is generally intended as instrument to manage and transfer risks (both 
private companies and public funds) in compensating victims but also in preventing losses 
by educating the insured machines thanks to the data acquired. 
 
 
 
‘I, on the other hand, am a finished 
product. I absorb electrical energy directly 
and utilize it with an almost one hundred 
percent efficiency. I am composed of strong 
metal, am continuously conscious, and can 
stand extremes of environment easily. These 
are facts which, with the self-evident 
proposition that no being can create another 
being superior to itself, smashes your silly 
hypothesis to nothing’. 
 
                       Isaac Asimov, I, Robot 
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I. Introduction 
Automation is considered as a technique for reducing human error and 
damage.1 We are usually oriented to consider automation only in terms of 
development of autonomous vehicles, but the phenomenon is much more 
widespread. Consider, for example: the use of automation in medicine, in 
particular in surgery; automation in smart contracts, (in which the parties agree 
the adoption of models for the adaptation of contractual contents to 
contingencies); smart agriculture, where the agricultural activity is guided by 
choices based on models capable of planning with respect to climate 
changeability and other occurrences; smart cities or cities that are able to direct 
traffic and provide information to users to improve the traffic, and quality of 
users’ life, etc. 
Automation can reduce human errors, and also damages, but cannot 
exclude the latter, especially when they cannot be eliminated. The question then 
becomes choosing which target is best to hit. The classic example is that of the 
autonomous vehicle that has provided a dramatic, but not avoidable alternative 
between killing the driver or a pedestrian walking across the street. Some countries 
try to find an answer by creating guidelines for these ‘dilemma situations’.2 This 
 
1 C.-Y. Chan, ‘Advancements, prospects, and impacts of automated driving systems’ 6 
International Journal of Transportation Science and Technology, 206 (2017). Among the first 
contributions, Id, ‘Hearings on automation and technological change’ Subcommittee on Economic 
Stabilization of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 14-28 (US Congress, October 
1955); W.S. Buckingham, Automation: Its Impact on Business and People (New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1961). 
2 In Germany an Ethics Commission on automated driving set up by Federal Minister A. 
Dobrindt. The Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure's Ethics Commission 
comprises fourteen academics and experts from the disciplines of ethics, law and technology. 
Among these are transport experts, legal experts, information scientists, engineers, philosophers, 
theologians, consumer protection representatives as well as representatives of associations and 
companies. The Ethics Commission's report comprises twenty propositions. The key elements 
are: 
- Automated and connected driving is an ethical imperative if the systems cause fewer 
accidents than human drivers (positive balance of risk); 
- Damage to property must take precedence over personal injury. In hazardous 
situations, the protection of human life must always have top priority; 
- In the event of unavoidable accident situations, any distinction between individuals 
based on personal features (age, gender, physical or mental constitution) is impermissible; 
- In every driving situation, it must be clearly regulated and apparent who is responsible 
for the driving task: the human or the computer; and 
- It must be documented and stored who is driving (to resolve possible issues of liability, 
among other things). 
Drivers must always be able to decide themselves whether their vehicle data are to be 
forwarded and used (data sovereignty). 
The Ethics Commission’s complete report can be found at www.bmvi.de/report-
ethicscommission. 
Moreover, we have to investigate what law shall regulate AI. The national legislator even if 
it concerns a transnational phenomenon collecting data from a transnational network of 
machines? See E. Giorgini, ‘Algorithms and Law’ 5 Italian Law Journal, 135 (2019). 
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could be an ethical solution, but what is the consequence if the software is 
programmed according to these guidelines? What is the impact of that on 
liability? The guidelines issued by the German Transport Ministry try to find 
solutions with regard to the issues of liability. In a report published in 2017 it 
stressed that, in every driving situation, it must be clearly regulated and apparent 
who is responsible for the driving task: the human or the computer. This 
information must be documented and stored who is driving in order to facilitate 
the victim in the proof of the dynamic of the accident.3 
Starting from these premises, we intend to answer to a fundamental 
question: how to prevent and compensate damage caused autonomously by a 
machine? Civil liability is the basic instrument to prevent and compensate damage 
also with the help of liability insurance, but damage that is nor referable to a 
person who can be considered responsible for the wrongful act complicates this 
paradigm. 
The above question is fundamental because effective instruments of 
compensation and prevention of damage caused by automation can reduce 
threats related to the use of automation and will permit the development of 
automated machines that will be safer, considering all the benefits raising from 
their use. Research based on SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, 
Threats) analysis demonstrates the benefits of adopting automation systems in 
transport. The SWOT analysis (also known as the SWOT matrix) is a strategic 
planning tool used to evaluate strengths, weaknesses (Weaknesses), opportunities 
(Opportunities) and threats of a project or in a company. Regulators and 
policymakers are increasingly involved in making important decisions about 
the governance of automated vehicles (AVs). Policymakers need to design 
comprehensive policies to deliver the benefits of AVs and to foresee and address 
potential unintended consequences; however, this is not an easy task. Especially 
given the complexity of the technology, AVs require a sophisticated analysis: 
 
3 See point 8, at 11 of the Report of Ethics Commission Automated and Connected 
Driving, available at https://tinyurl.com/y9wezt45 (last visited 10 January 2020). 
At the end, the report affirms that ‘genuine dilemmatic decisions, such as a decision 
between one human life and another, depend on the actual specific situation, incorporating 
‘unpredictable’ behavior by parties affected. They can thus not be clearly standardized, nor can 
they be programmed such that they are ethically unquestionable. Technological systems must 
be designed to avoid accidents. However, they cannot be standardized to a complex or intuitive 
assessment of the impacts of an accident in such a way that they can replace or anticipate the 
decision of a responsible driver with the moral capacity to make correct judgements. It is true 
that a human driver would be acting unlawfully if he killed a person in an emergency to save 
the lives of one or more other persons, but he would not necessarily be acting culpably. Such 
legal judgements, made in retrospect and taking special circumstances into account, cannot 
readily be transformed into abstract/general ex ante appraisals and thus also not into 
corresponding programming activities. For this reason, perhaps more than any other, it would 
be desirable for an independent public sector agency (for instance a Federal Bureau for the 
investigation of accidents involving automated transport systems or a Federal Office for safety 
in automated and connected transport) to systematically process the lessons learned’. 
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beyond the apparent safety and security issues, AVs have significant potential to 
impact issues related to privacy, accessibility, the environment, and land 
management. 
The opportunities include increased road safety and lowered social costs. 
As is well known, human errors, primarily due to causes like distracted driving, 
speeding, reckless driving, and driving under the influence, among others are 
believed to be responsible for over ninety per cent of these accidents. Increased 
mobility and accessibility is another such opportunity, considering the fact that 
AVs can serve as a more convenient mode of transportation point-to-point, 
especially for people unable to operate a vehicle manually (including youth, 
people with certain disabilities, and the elderly). A third opportunity involves 
environmental sustainability. AVs can help to improve environmental sustainability 
and could reduce CO2 emissions by three hundred million tons per year also 
because AVs will reduce traffic congestion. Researchers have suggested that 
AVs may increase worker productivity by ten-fifteen per cent and save around 
one billion hours every day. Currently available technologies, such as Event 
Data Recorders (EDR), are being used by the NHTSA to investigate crashes and 
clarify civil liabilities earlier, which may reduce litigation costs. 
In the next sections, we will try to answer the following questions, trying to 
find a solution to the issues of prevention and compensation in case of damage 
caused by machines acting autonomously with the use of algorithms. What do 
we mean with the term ‘automated choice’? Who is liable in case of damage 
caused by IA autonomously? Is it civil liability the most effective solution to 
compensation and prevention in case of damage caused by IA? In which way 
can insurance represent a solution?4  
 
 
II. What is an Automated Choice? 
Before considering the above-mentioned juridical issues, it is important to 
define the object of our considerations.  
With the use of the term ‘automated choice’, what is actually meant is a 
choice made using an algorithm? It is a choice without human factors normally 
influencing a choice. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines automation 
as: 
‘1) Automatic control of the manufacture of a product through a 
number of successive stages; 
2) the application of automatic control to any branch of industry or 
 
4 European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/103/EC of the relating to insurance 
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the 
obligation to insure against such liability (2009) OJ L263/11 (Directive on motor insurance). 
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science; 
3) by extension, the use of electronic or mechanical devices to replace 
human labor’.  
This definition needs to be read together with definition of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), as proposed within the European Commission’s Communication on AI1:  
‘Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to systems that display intelligent 
behavior by analyzing their environment and taking actions – with some 
degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals.  
AI-based systems can be purely software-based, acting in the virtual 
world (eg voice assistants, image analysis software, search engines, speech 
and face recognition systems). AI can also be embedded in hardware 
devices (eg advanced robots, autonomous cars, drones or Internet of 
Things applications)’. 
Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon affirmed that it is not possible to predict 
choices through models of optimal choice, arguing that any human decision 
making enters necessarily in contact with psychological processes. There is no 
human decision only where there is a full-automated choice. 
We have a case of a real automated choice in case of full automation. This 
involves is the technology by which a process or procedure is performed without 
human assistance. Automation usually implies the use of various control systems 
for operating with minimal or reduced human intervention, but some processes 
have been completely automated. As multiple examples, we can cite steering 
and stabilization of ships, aircraft and other applications and vehicles where 
different levels of automation are possible. 
The above table illustrates that the SAE (Society of Automobile Engineers) 
international’s on-road automated vehicle standards committee, along with 
experts from industry and government, the information report defining key 
concepts related to the increasing automation of on-road vehicles. Central to 
this report are six levels of driving automation: 0 (no automation), 1 (driver 
assistance), 2 (partial automation), 3 (conditional automation), 4 (high automation), 
and 5 (full automation). 
In order to define the cause of action in case of an automated choice, it is 
important to consider the above-mentioned levels of automation. Generally 
speaking and not only with regard to vehicles we can distinguish, the levels of 
automation as following: 
- at level one the human operator acts and turns to the computer to 
implement her actions;  
- at level two the computer helps the human operator by determining the 
options;  
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- at level three the computer suggests options and the human operator can 
choose to follow the recommendation; 
- at level four the computer selects the action and the human operator 
decides if it should be done or not;  
- at level five the computer selects the action and implements it if the 
human operator approves the selected action;  
- at level six the computer selects the action and informs the human 
operator who can cancel the action;  
- at level seven the computer does the action and inform the human 
operator;  
- at level eight the computer does the action and inform the human only if 
the human operator asks;  
- at level nine the computer does the action and informs the human 
operator only if the computer decides the operator should be told; and 
- at level ten the computer does the action if it decides it should be done. 
The computer informs the human operator only if it decides the operator 
should be told.  
Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens also distinguish four models of 
human information processing: 
1. Sensory processing, which refers to the acquisition and registration of 
multiple sources of information and includes the positioning and orienting of 
sensory receptors, sensory processing, initial pre-processing of data prior to full 
perception, and selective attention. This model can be translated in the function 
of information acquisition; 
2. Perception and/or working memory, which regards conscious perception 
and manipulation of processed and retrieved information in working memory. 
It includes cognitive operations such as rehearsal, integration and inference, but 
these operations occur prior to the point of decision. This model can be 
translated in the function of information analysis; 
3. Decision making, which means that a decision is based on such 
cognitive processing. This model can be translated in the function of decision 
and action selection; and 
4. Response selection, which involves the implementation of a response or 
action consistent with the decision choice. This model can be translated in the 
function of decision and action implementation. 
With regard to the four functions discussed above, it is possible to provide 
an initial categorization for types of tasks in which automation can support the 
human operator: 
1. Information acquisition: the automation of information acquisition can 
be applied to the sensing and registration of input data; 
2. Information analysis: the automation in this function involves cognitive 
functions such as working memory and inferential processes; 
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3. Decision and action selection. The decision and action selection involve 
selection from among decision alternatives; and 
4. Action implementation, which refers to the actual execution of the 
action choice. 
In accordance with the opinion of some scholars: automation should be 
human-centered; automation systems should be comprehensible; it should 
ensure operators are not removed from command role; it should support 
situation awareness; it should never perform or fail silently; management 
automation should improve system management; designers should assume 
that operators will become reliant on reliable automation. 
 
 
III. Civil Liability, Automation and Self-Learning Machine. Who is 
Liable? 
As previously explained, automation can reduce human errors, but not 
damage, especially when damage cannot be avoided. A proper management of 
these problems typically requires funds to compensate victims, the implementation 
of effective strategies and a plan for prevention of damage. Fund-raising and 
prevention strategies are, therefore, key aspects. 
The economic analysis of tort law assumes that a legal rule of liability will 
give incentives to potential parties in an accident setting for careful behavior. 
Thus economists tend to stress the deterrent function of tort law. On the other 
hand, lawyers tend to stress the ‘ex post accident’ problems, where there is a victim 
that needs to be compensated. Lawyers focus their attention on the importance 
of fund raising to compensate losses. Actually, these two approaches are not 
that ‘black and white’. Lawyers also stress the deterrent function of tort law and 
economists pay attention to compensation issues. It is important to find the 
way to deter and compensate at the same time. 
It is clear that liability will give incentives for efficient prevention and will 
ensure compensation of damages. At the same time, civil liability aims at providing 
a compensation mechanism for those who have suffered harm caused by the 
actions of others. Terminology and the actual principles may differ between 
distinct jurisdictions, but the core of functions remains common: deterrence 
and a fair distribution of historic costs and risks. In order to cover both functions, it 
is important that the civil sanction is going to punish the wrongdoer, the person 
who takes the harmful action, intentionally or with gross negligence. 
Most of the literature, and the European Institutions norms dealing with 
compensation for damage caused in the event of automation, have raised the 
question of the possible responsibility or co-responsibility of the producer 
and/or programmer.5 So, most of the efforts are on the reform of the directive 
 
5 Many authors wrote on the new challenges posed by A.I. in Tort law matters. See eg F.P. 
2020]  The Insurance Perspective  66                  
on manufacturer liability and on cybersecurity. Scholars have also been concerned 
with reviewing the concept of guilt of the owner and/or user of the automated 
product, but, for example, raising the level of diligence required.6 
Without wanting to raise any criticism to the theories that surely have 
seized central aspects of this theme, we intend to draw attention to aspects linked 
to the problem of man-machine interaction and the so-called self-learning of 
the machine in the case of losses highlighting how civil liability is perhaps not 
sufficient to compensate and above all to prevent damages. 
The recommendations to the European Commission on civil law rules on 
robotics (2015/2103(INL) stressed this point, noting that robots are not simple 
toys.7 
Our considerations become particularly current and important if we move 
from the field in which the attention of the doctrine is normally focused: automated 
vehicles, to consider other areas in which the problem of compensation and 
prevention of damage caused by automated machines arises, such as, medicine 
and agriculture. In these areas the interaction between machines and men 
(owner, user, producer, programmer, machine’s manager, etc) are so many and 
complex that it becomes difficult to identify the person (s) responsible.  
The recourse to solidarity between co-responsible parties, in the legal systems 
which know to the institute of the so-called passive solidarity, also fails to 
resolve the difficulties for the victim to identify the person responsible. If it is 
 
Hubbard, ‘Sophisticated Robots: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation’ 66 Florida 
Law Review, 1803 (2015); S. Chopra and L.F. White, A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial 
Agents (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011); S. Gless and K. Seelmann eds, Intelligente 
Agenten und das Recht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016). 
In particular, these authors have rightly placed the attention on the concept of defect in 
view of what may be the ‘defects’ in the case of artificial intelligence and of a reasonable duty of 
safety and care. 
6 D.C. Vladeck, ‘Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence’ 
89 Washington Law Review, 117, 130 (2014): ‘it is useful to pause to consider whether the 
standard of care to be applied to driver-less cars will be different than the standard applied to 
cars driven by humans. There is every reason to think that the answer will be ‘yes’, and that fact 
may bear on the analysis that follows’. With regard to industry the Author consider the role 
played by Industry with regard to consumers expectations. ‘Manufacturers, through advertising 
and other communications with consumers, play a key role in shaping consumer expectations. 
Unless the manufacturer makes inflated and unjustified representations about its product’s 
performance, consumers are likely to expect that their products will perform in a way that is 
consistent with prevailing standards as articulated by the products’ manufacturers, even if 
better and safer products are achievable at a nominal cost’ (at 137). 
7 ‘The more autonomous robots are, the less they can be considered to be simple tools in 
the hands of other actors (such as the manufacturer, the operator, the owner, the user, etc); 
whereas this, in turn, questions whether the ordinary rules on liability are sufficient or whether 
it calls for new principles and rules to provide clarity on the legal liability of various actors 
concerning responsibility for the acts and omissions of robots where the cause cannot be traced 
back to a specific human actor and whether the acts or omissions of robots which have caused 
harm could have been avoided’: Report 27 January 2017 with recommendations to the Commission 
on civil law rules on robotics (2015/2103(INL)), Committee on Legal Affairs, Rapporteur: M. 
Delvaux, available at https://tinyurl.com/y4gjaujn (last visited 10 January 2020). 
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true that, in the case of solidarity between the responsible persons, the victim 
can recut against each of them for the entire damage, it is also true that, in a 
civil proceeding each potentially responsible person will try to prove that the 
action of the others has excluded the own responsibility. There could also be a 
real risk of extending the time needed to compensate the damage. Moreover, 
the damage is usually so huge and with domino effects that prevention, rather 
than compensation, becomes fundamental. 
One solution can be found in special legal provisions about joint liability. 
This issue of the presence of a plurality of actors in the wrongdoing does not 
emerge if we say that all subjects involved are automatically joint tortfeasors. In 
this case, they are jointly liable and then it is their task to find out internally (ie 
within their internal relations) who owes to whom, what amount as far as 
internal recourse, (ie the restitution of the part of the damage paid on behalf of 
the other tortfeasors).8 This solution needs legislative intervention to assign liability 
to all actors independently of the proof of their culpability and of the causal 
chain in the determination of the wrongdoing. The problem is to determine, in 
abstract, all the possible actors. It is possible to place objectively joint liability on 
the main actors (ie the actors bearing the risk of automation like the owner, the 
user, the manufacturer, the programmer of the automated machine/s involved). 
The victim could sue one of them, and, as said, they have to find out within their 
internal relations who owes what amount to whom, as far as internal recourse is 
concerned. In this case, there could also be a problem of costs sustainability, 
especially if we consider that insurance contracts usually don’t cover joint liability. 
Accordingly, the actor who paid to the victim the full amount of damage will be 
covered by his/her insurer only with regard to his/her part of liability. Although 
we could discuss the unfairness of such an exclusion, insurers, however, justify 
it because, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, (and for the purpose of 
determining the premium) they assessed the risk of the insured person alone 
and not also of a possible co-responsible party. 
Moreover, another question that arises is whether we are sure that damage 
in automation, cases is always caused by the owner and/or the manufacturer 
and/or the user? 
In case of full automation, special problems regard the proof of damage 
causation arise. The causal link is a problem of knowledge of the origin of things 
and phenomena, which has accompanied the development of philosophical and 
scientific thought since its origins starting from the Aristotelian vision of science 
and principles,9 up to a more recent period in which knowledge of the causation 
 
8 I’ve to thank Professor Á. Fuglinszky, full professor at Elte University in Budapest about 
these considerations. 
9 See Aristotele, Fisica, libro I (Milano: Mondadori, 1996), 134, at 10; F. Laudisa, Causalità, 
Storia di un modello di conoscenza (Roma: Carocci, 1999). In natural sciences, the causal 
nexus is considered to infer the events of the unknown future from the present ones that can be 
immediately perceived. In legal studies, the causal nexus is considered to identify among a 
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laws is due to a mediation of the empirical data.10 The recent skepticism regarding 
the possibility to understand the real causation of events has not stopped scientific 
interest in the causal processes. New probabilistic theories postulate the possibility 
of replacing the search for the truth by looking for what is highly probable.11 
The application of probabilistic judgments with regard to the identification 
of causal links finds a particular application in ascertaining causality in law. 
There, the favor veritatis is limited to instances of economics of judgments and 
legal limits to the proof of the facts that require the achievement of compromises 
suitable to satisfy the plurality of ends that the order intends to reach with the 
verification of the causal link between legally relevant facts. 
In this paper we will consider only the causality in civil liability where causality 
could be considered, in the different legal system, as a ‘variable factor’.12 
There are many different causal theories, however, and here we will recall 
the ones most important. A first theory is the so-called theory of the condicio 
sine qua non: the cause of an event will be the one that constitutes the condition 
without which the fact would not be determined, considering the chain of 
antecedents that have contributed to produce the result having legal significance. 
This criterion has been criticized for its excessive width. The investigation should 
 
plurality of events, that are potentially the efficient cause of a given phenomenon already 
realized, the legally relevant circumstance for the determination of the phenomenon. 
Accordingly, it seems that, in civil liability judgments, the decisions on the causal nexus must 
take place through cognitive processes of an inferential-inductive type, articulated according to 
counterfactual conditions. ‘The process of counterfactual reasoning has three stages. The first 
two of these are somewhat counterintuitive and are easily ignored by analysts. But, they are 
essential to structuring one’s counterfactual reasoning properly. First, one must establish the 
particular way in which the alternate possibility comes to be (ie, develop its ‘back-story'). 
Second, one must evaluate the events that occur between the time of the alternate possibility 
and the time for which one is considering its consequences. And third, one must examine the 
possible consequences of the alternate possibility’s back-story and the events that follow it. In 
doing so, an analyst must connect their conclusion to the specific type of strategic assessment 
the counterfactual will be used to support: decision making under risk or decision making 
under uncertainty’, see further N. Hendrickson, Counterfactual Reasoning: a Basic Guide for 
Analysts, Strategists and Decision Makers (Plymouth: Proteus Monographs, 2008), 1-2. The 
counterfactual reasoning represents the way to analyze possibilities, considering what would or 
might happen if one of the possibilities were to occur. 
10 B. Russell, ‘On the Notion of Cause’ 13 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1 (1912). 
11 P. Suppes, A Probabilistic Theory of Causality (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing 
Company, 1970) 41; W.C. Salmon, ‘Probabilistic Causality’ 61 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 
50 (1980), claiming that events in the causal chain need to be considered not individually but 
considering their connections. 
12 V. Zeno Zencovich, ‘Il nesso causale profili di diritto comparato’ Persona & Danno (8 
January 2009). He observes that the causal element is a function of three other aspects: the 
fault of the agent, the nature of the injured interests, the extent of the damage caused. 
Simplifying, we can say that the rigor in the causal rule will be inversely proportional to the 
gravity of the fault (or even the intent), to the hierarchical location of the protected interest 
(first of all, life) and to the dimensions of the damaging event. When the value attributed to one 
of these elements is particularly high, the judge will tend to reduce the importance of the causal 
rules, or to easily consider the connection. 
69   The Italian Law Journal [Vol. 06 – No. 01 
have as its object every event that even in a small part may have contributed to 
the cause of the fact.13 
A second theory focuses on relevant conditions according to probabilistic 
criteria. Scholars have hypothesized that the adoption of a criterion that seeks 
the cause of a given event according to a judgment of a prognostic type based on 
probabilistic laws. A judgment, therefore, should not stop at the empirical 
perception of the plurality of existing conditions, but identifies the efficient cause of 
the phenomenon by placing as the object of the cognitive act not only what 
occurred, but rather what should have occurred according to a probabilistic 
prognosis.14 
The use of the criterion of probability moves from the assumption that the 
legal causal assessment is represented by an ex post judgment given in the 
mind of the interpreter. If this premise is true, then the objective of the 
cognitive act of the jurist cannot be the identification of the true cause, but the 
determination of the event that turns out to be the appropriate cause of a given 
fact according to probabilistic laws.15 The probabilistic theory has been developed 
by German scholars with some correction considering the adequate cause 
according to the best scientific knowledge.16 
Considering the role of causation in civil liability and the above-mentioned 
theories, we must conclude that the question ‘who is liable?’ depends to the 
answer to another question ‘who caused the damage?’ 
 
 
IV. Who Caused the Damage? 
The presence of an automated choice affects the process of determining the 
event and the effect of the choice. As we have seen, the interaction between 
algorithms and human action may be present at different levels. According to 
 
13 N. Godmann, ‘The problem of Counterfactual Conditional’ 44 Journal of Philosophy, 
113 (1947); J.L. Mackie ‘Counterfactuals and Causal Laws’, in R.J. Butler ed, 1 Analytical 
Philosophy: First Series, 66 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); E. Nagel, La struttura 
della Scienza (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1968), 76. 
14 G.O. Robinson, ‘Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk’ 14 The 
Journal of Legal Studies, 779 (1985).  
15 Probability should be considered according to the scientific evolution. See further G. 
Ponzanelli, ‘Scienza, verità e diritto: il caso Bendectin. Nota a Corte Suprema USA 28 giugno 
1993’ Foro italiano, 184 (1994). 
16 See K. Engish, Die Kausalitat als Merkmal der strafrechtlichen Tatbestande (Tuebingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1931), 41. German scholars focus also on the necessity to consider the scope of 
the liability rule. See P. Sourlas, Adäquanztheorie und Normzwecklehre bei der Begründung 
der Haftung nach Paragraph 823 Abs. 1 BGB (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974). See also F. 
Realmonte, Il problema del rapporto di causalità nel risarcimento del danno (Milano: Giuffrè, 
1967), 1-44; A.D. Candian, Responsabilità civile e assicurazione (Milano: Giuffrè, 1993), 25; G. 
Alpa, ‘I fatti illeciti’, in Pietro Rescigno ed, Trattato di diritto privato (Torino: UTET, 1995), 1-
63; G. Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1970). 
2020]  The Insurance Perspective  70                  
the theory of probability, the human agent can be held responsible for the 
action if it is proved that the action was caused with high probability by the 
human agent. The problem is that such a vision does not take into account the 
interaction between man and machine in causing the event. 
Let us hypothesize that a subject is acting using a semi-automated mechanism 
where the computer selects the action and informs the human operator, who 
can cancel the action, and also that the computer chooses an incorrect option 
and does not warn the person in time for her to be, able to intervene and avoid 
damage to third parties. It will not be enough to consider the probability that 
the computer error has caused the damage, but it will also be necessary to verify 
that the user, in case of correct warning from the computer, would have acted 
differently. 
Therefore, we have a double counterfactual judgement: one with regard to 
the human choice and another with regard to the automated choice. If it has 
been proved that the cause of the accident is the automated choice, it will still be 
necessary to consider whether the computer error is a production error or if the 
option chosen by the computer is linked to the combination of algorithms and 
to an evolution of such a combination in a way that is autonomous from its own 
manufacturer. If the action or omission of the machine does not refer to a 
human action or omission, we must say that, regarding the causation 
proceeding, we are in the presence of an irresistible force that is not imputable 
to the user nor to the manufacturer.17 
 
17 A problem correlated to the present is the possibility to recognize subjectivity to automated 
machine. See European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to 
the Commission on civil law rules on robotics (2015/2103(INL)): 
‘T. whereas Asimov's Laws must be regarded as being directed at the designers, producers 
and operators of robots, including robots assigned with built-in autonomy and self-learning, 
since those laws cannot be converted into machine code; 
U. whereas a series of rules, governing in particular liability, transparency and accountability, 
are useful, reflecting the intrinsically European and universal humanistic values that characterise 
Europe’s contribution to society, are necessary; whereas those rules must not affect the process 
of research, innovation and development in robotics; 
V. whereas the Union could play an essential role in establishing basic ethical principles to 
be respected in the development, programming and use of robots and AI and in the 
incorporation of such principles into Union regulations and codes of conduct, with the aim of 
shaping the technological revolution so that it serves humanity and so that the benefits of 
advanced robotics and AI are broadly shared, while as far as possible avoiding potential 
pitfalls; (….) 
Z. whereas, thanks to the impressive technological advances of the last decade, not only 
are today's robots able to perform activities which used to be typically and exclusively human, 
but the development of certain autonomous and cognitive features – eg the ability to learn 
from experience and take quasi-independent decisions – has made them more and more 
similar to agents that interact with their environment and are able to alter it significantly; 
whereas, in such a context, the legal responsibility arising through a robot’s harmful action 
becomes a crucial issue; 
AA. whereas a robot's autonomy can be defined as the ability to take decisions and 
implement them in the outside world, independently of external control or influence; whereas 
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This is perfectly in line with the recommendations to the European 
Commission on civil law rules on robotics (2015/2103(INL) saying that: ‘the 
more autonomous robots are, the less they can be considered to be simple tools 
in the hands of other actors’. Thus, it is important to reshape civil liability 
and/or find other mechanisms to prevent and compensate losses when  
‘the cause cannot be traced back to a specific human actor and (when) 
the acts or omissions of robots which have caused harm could have been 
avoided’.18 
The term ‘force majeure’ is frequently used to indicate causes that are 
outside the control of the parties, such as natural disasters, that could not be 
evaded through the exercise of due care. Force majeure is a circumstance that 
no human foresight could anticipate or which, if anticipated, is too strong to be 
controlled.19 Depending on the legal system, such an event may relieve the 
parties from the obligation to compensate damage. The term ‘force majeure’ 
comes from French but with regard to the present meaning it is important to 
remember the German concept of ‘höhere Gewalt’. According to German 
jurisprudence, there is a höhere Gewalt if the event causing the damage has an 
external effect and the harm caused cannot be averted or rendered harmless by 
the extremely reasonable care.20 However, it must be noted that the French 
force majeure is not identical with the German höhere Gewalt.21 The French 
legal term ‘force majeure’ is in the narrowest sense limited to natural events, but 
in the broadest sense it is synonymous with the German term.  
Regarding the case of automation, with the term force majeure we mean a 
force that is external to the actors (owner, user, manufacturer, programmer 
 
this autonomy is of a purely technological nature and its degree depends on how sophisticated 
a robot's interaction with its environment has been designed to be’. See G. Borges, ‘Rechtliche 
Rahmenbedingungen für autonome Systeme’ 71 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 977 (2018); 
S. Beck, ‘Der Richtliche Status autonomer Maschinen’ Aktuelle Juristische Praxis, 183 (2017).  
18 B. Russell, n 10 above. 
19 C. Plinii, ‘Quae quum acciderint, vis major appellatur’ Secundi Historiae mundi. Libri 
XXXVII, LXIX. 
20 RG VI 455/20, RGZ 101, 94, 95; RG IV 745/26, RGZ 117, 12, 13; BGH VII ZR 172/86, 
BGHZ 100, 185, 188. 
21 A. Blaschczok, Gefährdungshaftung und Risikozuweisung (Köln: C. Heymann, 1993); 
N. Jansen, Die Struktur des Haftungsrechts (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003). See also: BGH 
X ZR 146/11; LG Frankfurt am Mein, lexetius.com/2012, 4178 – which took into account also 
EU law. The European Union legislature has therefore chosen a term which, in the starting point, 
is similar to the criterion of force majeure (as used in Common Position (EC) no 27/2003 of 18 
March 2003 OJ C 125 E/63). The legislator’s consideration of the concept of force majeure, 
inherent in the concept of force majeure, is such that exceptional circumstances do not per se 
eliminate the obligation to compensate. This is only the case if the exceptional circumstances 
could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. 
About the new risks related to automation H. Zech, ‘Zivilrechtliche Haftung für den Einsatz 
von Roboten’, in S. Gless and K. Seelmann eds, Intelligente Agenten und das Recht n 5 above, 
163 fn. 
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and, way not the public administration approving guidelines and conditions for 
the use of automation)22 and irresistible, ie any actors cannot prevent or avoid 
the automated choice, for instance because, thanks to self- learning, the machine is 
acting in an unpredictable way respect to the preprogrammed choice.23 
 
22 For instance, in Italy on 28 February 2018, the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure 
(MIT) issued a decree which permits road testing of automatic guided vehicles.  
The decreto legislativo of 28 February 2018 was implemented taking into account Regulation 
(EC) 377/2014 of the Parliament and of the European Council of 3 April 2014, establishing the 
program Copernicus and repealing Regulation (EU) 911/2010; and having regard to European 
Parliament and Council Directive 2010/40/EU of the of 7 July 2010, on the general framework 
for dissemination intelligent transport systems in the transport sector and interfaces with other 
modes of transport 
The Act of Italian Minister of Transport reports interventions, times and types of roads 
involved. 
The Decree identifies functional standards to create more connected and safer roads that, 
thanks to new technologies introduced in road infrastructures, can dialogue with users on 
board vehicles, in order to provide real-time information on traffic, accidents, weather conditions, 
up to tourist news that characterize the different routes. They will cover newly constructed or 
governmental motorways or governmental sections. In particular, in a first phase, by 2025, 
action is taken on the Italian infrastructures belonging to the European TEN-T network, Trans 
European Network - Transport, and on the entire motorway and state network. Progressively, 
the services will be extended to the entire network of the national integrated transport system, 
as identified by the annex to DEF Decree 17 April 2017 ‘Connecting Italy’. 
By 2030, we expect that further services will be activated: diversion of flows, intervention 
on average speeds to avoid congestion, suggestion of trajectories, dynamic management of 
access, parking and refueling, even electric; the installation of devices for the structural 
monitoring of the static nature of road works. 
The interventions for the transformation in smart road have been identified after a 
comparison with the sector and taking into account what has already been achieved by some 
motorway concessionaires and by Anas (the company that manages the Italian roads). 
At the same time, the decree draws the path towards the experimentation of innovative 
driver assistance systems on new connected infrastructures. 
The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport can authorize, on request and after a 
specific investigation, the testing of automatically guided vehicles on certain stretches of road, 
according to specific procedures and controls during the experimentation, with the aim of 
ensuring that it takes place in conditions of absolute security. University institutes, public and 
private research institutes, vehicle manufacturers equipped with automatic driving 
technologies may apply for authorization. 
23 Cour de Cassation, Chambre civile 2, 8 February 2018, no 16-26.198, P+B+I, ‘le tiers 
avait poussé la victime sur les rails alors que le train redémarrait. La Haute juridiction 
affirme que “ le comportement du tiers qui pousse un usager contre une rame alors que celle-
ci redémarre n’est nullement irrésistible pour la RATP, qui dispose de moyens modernes 
adaptés permettant de prévenir ce type d’accident, de sorte que le fait du tiers ne présentait 
pas les caractéristiques de la force majeure exonératoire de la responsabilité pesant sur elle"’; 
Cour de Cassacion, Chambre civile 2, 8 February 2018, no 17-10.516, P+B+I 'le tiers, souffrant 
de schizophrénie, avait ceinturé et entrainé la victime sur les rails, et l’enquête avait conclu à 
un homicide volontaire et un suicide. Le Fonds de garantie des victimes d’actes de terrorisme 
a indemnisé les ayants droit de la victime et s’est par la suite retourné contre la SNCF. Pour 
exonérer cette dernière de toute responsabilité, la Cour de cassation relève que “aucune 
altercation n’avait opposé les deux hommes qui ne se connaissaient pas, qu’un laps de temps 
très court s’était écoulé entre le début de l’agression et la collision avec le train (…) et 
qu’aucune mesure de surveillance ni aucune installation n’aurait permis de prévenir ou 
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In case of the intervention of force majeure, there is an interruption of the 
causal chain. So, in case of an automated choice acting like a force majeure it is 
not possible, according to the ordinary rules of civil liability, to put the liability 
on the owner/user of the machine (the owner/user of the automated vehicle, 
the hospital that is the owner/user of the automated machine for surgery, etc.).  
The term force majeure, in case of civil liability, indicates a cause of break of 
the causation chain such as the case of an act of God and other natural events. 
The defendant’s liability ceases at the moment in time when the supervening 
inevitable condition occurs.24 Rather than referring to contractual liability, force 
majeure is instead a cause justifying the breach of contract as it determines the 
impossibility of fulfilling the performance requested by the contract. 
We must also reflect on the possibility of eliminating the relevance to the 
causal link in some cases through legislative provisions. The problem is that, by 
eliminating the relevance of the causal link, the deterrent function of civil 
liability would also be eliminated, or at least strongly reduced. If no liability can 
operate in this case, no liability insurance can operate at the same time. Civil 
liability is the object of coverage in case of liability insurance. 
It could be possible to provide for other forms of compensation, such as the 
establishment of public funds financed through a specific tax paid by the owners 
or by the users of automated machines. Those funds would cover damage caused 
by totally automated machines that can give rise to cases of damage where no 
one claims responsibility. In European Union member states and not only with 
regard to vehicles, a public fund for victims of car accidents already exists.25 
With regard to the liability in case of automated choice, we have to remember 
 
d’empêcher une telle agression, sauf à installer des façades de quai dans toutes les stations ce 
qui, compte tenu de l’ampleur des travaux et du fait que la SNCF n’était pas propriétaire des 
quais, ne pouvait être exigé de celle-ci à ce jour”. Elle en déduit que c’est à bon droit que la 
cour d’appel a conclu à la caractérisation d’un cas de force majeure. La solution sur ce second 
point semble mettre un point final à la rigueur d’appréciation de la force majeure 
exonératoire de la responsabilité du transporteur (par exemple, Cass. 1re civ., 21 nov. 2006, 
n° 05-10.783, Bull. civ. I, n° 511 ; pour une appréciation de la faute de la victime non constitutive 
de la force majeure : Cass. ch. mixte, 28 nov. 2008, n° 06-12.307, Bull. civ. ch. mixte, n° 3), 
courant qui avait été amorcé en 2011 (Cass. 1re civ., 23 juin 2011, n° 10-15.811, Bull. civ. I, n° 123)’. 
24 See, in common law, Carslogie Steamship Co Ltd v Royal Norwegian Government 
(1952) AC 292. The complaint’s vessel was damaged by a collision with the defendant. After the 
collision the complaint repaired the vessel that was certified to sail for NY. On the way the 
vessel suffered other damage from stormy weather at sea. The Court held that the defendant 
from the collision, not for further damage sustained by the natural events at the sea. 
25 European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against 
civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to 
insure against such liability (2009) OJ L 263/11: According to the Directive 2009/103/EC, 
point 53: ‘Where it is impossible to identify the insurer of a vehicle, it should be provided that 
the ultimate debtor in respect of the damages to be paid to the injured party is the guarantee 
fund provided for this purpose situated in the Member State where the uninsured vehicle, the 
use of which has caused the accident, is normally based. Where it is impossible to identify the 
vehicle, it should be provided that the ultimate debtor is the guarantee fund provided for this 
purpose situated in the Member State in which the accident occurred.’ 
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the premises of the European Parliament’s Resolution on robotics.26 There, the 
European Parliament seems to propose a form of strict liability for users or 
owners of robots and does not consider the causal nexus. In the case of strict 
liability, the fault or the negligence of the person held responsible by the law is 
not relevant, but causality is a different condition in civil liability from the proof 
of fault or of negligence of the actors. 
Moreover, even if a special normative intervention eliminates the proof of a 
causal link, victims, who sue for compensation of losses caused by automated 
choice have to face the problem of the interconnected responsibilities usually 
present in case of automation. Machines utilize information to make elaborate 
choices from different sources. Some of these sources are automated machines 
themselves. Automation operates in a cyberspace that is 
 ‘a time-dependent set of interconnected information systems and the 
human users that interact with these systems’.27  
It means that it is difficult to determine who is liable in such cases. 
It could be possible to anticipate liability at the moment of the ‘choice on 
automation’ putting liability not on the cause/s of the damage, but on who 
bears the risk of automation the manufacturer, the owner and/or the user. 
 
26 European Parliament, Resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), available at 
https://tinyurl.com/t5zrewh (last visited 10 January 2020): ‘whereas the more autonomous 
robots are, the less they can be considered to be simple tools in the hands of other actors (such 
as the manufacturer, the operator, the owner, the user, etc); whereas this, in turn, questions 
whether the ordinary rules on liability are sufficient or whether it calls for new principles and 
rules to provide clarity on the legal liability of various actors concerning responsibility for the 
acts and omissions of robots where the cause cannot be traced back to a specific human actor 
and whether the acts or omissions of robots which have caused harm could have been avoided; 
AC. whereas, ultimately, the autonomy of robots raises the question of their nature in the 
light of the existing legal categories or whether a new category should be created, with its own 
specific features and implications; 
AD. whereas under the current legal framework robots cannot be held liable per se for 
acts or omissions that cause damage to third parties; whereas the existing rules on liability 
cover cases where the cause of the robot’s act or omission can be traced back to a specific human 
agent such as the manufacturer, the operator, the owner or the user and where that agent could 
have foreseen and avoided the robot’s harmful behavior; whereas, in addition, manufacturers, 
operators, owners or users could be held strictly liable for acts or omissions of a robot; 
AE. whereas according to the current legal framework for product liability - where the 
producer of a product is liable for a malfunction- and rules governing liability for harmful actions -
where the user of a product is liable for a behavior that leads to harm- apply to damages caused 
by robots or AI; 
AF. whereas in the scenario where a robot can take autonomous decisions, the traditional 
rules will not suffice to give rise to legal liability for damage caused by a robot, since they would 
not make it possible to identify the party responsible for providing compensation and to 
require that party to make good the damage it has caused’. 
27 See the definition proposed by NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre, available at 
https://tinyurl.com/v8cex2b (last visited 10 January 2020). 
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V. Reshaping the Manufacturer Liability, Motor Liability and Motor 
Insurance 
Particular attempts to find solutions to compensation issues can be found 
in some interventions at level of national law and of European legislation trying 
to reshape liability in case of motor liability and in case of manufacturer liability. 
In the United States, different statutes have been enacted about the use of 
automated vehicles. Some States (California, Florida and Nevada) provide that 
it is mandatory for drivers of automated vehicles to submit an insurance or a 
surety bond or to give proof of a self-insurance.28 Moreover, Nevada’s legislation 
does not require a licensed operator for a ‘fully autonomous vehicle’ if the 
vehicle can achieve ‘a minimal risk condition’ in the event of a failure.29 A 
different solution has been proposed by other States, which require a human 
operator to be present and capable of taking over in an emergency.30 In 
German law, a new § 1a StVG (the German law on motor liability) on ‘Motor 
vehicles with highly or fully automated driving function’31 has been introduced 
 
28 See Cal Veh Code § 38750(b) (3) (2015); Fla Stat Ann § 316.86 (2016); Nev Rev Stat 
Ann § 482.060 (2015). 
29 See Nev Rev Stat Ann § 482A.200. 
A deep analysis of worldwide legislation on automated cars has been made by Aida Joaquin 
Acosta, ‘What Governments Across the Globe Are Doing to Seize the Benefits of Autonomous 
Vehicles’ available at https://tinyurl.com/tb2w56p (last visited 10 January 2020). 
30 B. A Browne, ‘Self-Driving Cars: On The Road To a New Regulatory Era’ 8 Journal of 
Law, Technology and the Internet 1, 12 (2017).  
31 Straßenverkehrsgesetz (5 March 2003) BGBl. I S. 310, 919 (StVG): 
‘§ 1a Kraftfahrzeuge mit hoch- oder vollautomatisierter Fahrfunktion 
(1) The operation of a motor vehicle by means of highly or fully automated driving 
function is permitted if the function is used as intended. 
(2) Motor vehicles with highly or fully automated driving function within the meaning of 
this Act are those which have technical equipment, 
1. To control the driving task - including longitudinal and transverse guidance - the respective 
motor vehicle after activation control (vehicle control), 
2. which is able to comply with traffic regulations directed at vehicle guidance during 
highly or fully automated vehicle control, 
3. which can be manually overridden or deactivated by the driver at any time, 
4. can recognize the necessity of the vehicle hand control by the driver, 
5. the driver can visually, acoustically, tactually or otherwise perceptibly display the 
requirement of the autograph vehicle control with sufficient reserve of time before the vehicle 
control is delivered to the driver, and 
6. indicates use contrary to one of the system descriptions. 
The manufacturer of such a motor vehicle must declare in the system description that the 
vehicle complies with the requirements of sentence 1. 
(3) The preceding paragraphs shall only be applied to vehicles which are approved in 
accordance with § 1 (1), which comply with the requirements of paragraph 2 sentence 1 and 
whose highly or fully automated driving functions 
1. are described in, and comply with, international regulations applicable in the scope of 
this Act; or 
2. A type-approval pursuant to Article 20 of Directive 2007/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval 
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on 16 June 2017. Under German law, the liability of the car owner as in § 7 
StVG, in the case of an autonomous vehicle, remains unaffected anyway, since 
the owner is liable for all damage that can be referred to the ‘operation of a 
motor vehicle’. So it is just an additional liability of the motor vehicle driver. For 
this purpose, the new norm contained in § 1a StVG says that the user must 
remain receptive to be able to take control immediately.32 
In fact, under § 1a StVG, an automated vehicle: must be able to be manually 
overridden or deactivated by the driver at any time; shall recognize the necessity of 
the vehicle hand control by the driver; and shall visually, acoustically, tactually 
or otherwise discernibly indicate to the vehicle driver the requirement of the 
vehicle hand control with sufficient time reserve before the vehicle control is 
delivered to the vehicle driver. 
In Italy, the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure (MIT) issued a decree 
on February 28, 2018 which permits road testing of automatic guided vehicles. 
It was implemented taking into account Regulation (EU) 377/2014 of the 
Parliament and of the European Council of 3 April 2014, establishing the program 
Copernicus and repealing regulation (EU) 911/2010; and having regard to 
directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 
2010, on the general framework for dissemination intelligent transport systems 
in the transport sector and interfaces with other modes of transport. Regarding 
liability in case of accidents, Art 1 letter J of the Decree says that  
‘the occupant of the vehicle, who must be always able to take control of 
the vehicle regardless of the degree of automation of the same, in any 
moment the need arises, acting on the vehicle controls with absolute 
precedence over automated systems and which, therefore, is the person 
responsible for the circulation of the vehicle’. 
Insurance issues also take a relevant role in these cases. 
In May 2018, the European Commission presented a proposal to amend 
the motor insurance directive.33 Under these revamped rules, once adopted by 
the European Parliament and the Council: victims of motor vehicle accidents 
will be able to receive the full compensation they are due, even when the insurer 
is insolvent; drivers who have a previous claims history in another EU country 
will be treated equally to domestic policyholders, and will potentially benefit 
 
of motor vehicles and their trailers and of systems, components and separate technical units 
intended for such vehicles (Framework Directive ) (OJ L 263, 9.10.2007, p. 
(4) Driver is also the one who activates a highly or fully automated driving function 
referred to in paragraph 2 and used for vehicle control, even if he does not control the vehicle 
in the context of the intended use of this function by hand’. 
32 See R. Greger, ‘Haftungsfragen beim automatisierten Fahren. Zum Arbeitskreis II des 
Verkehrsgerichtstags’ 31 Neue Zeitschrift fuer Verkehrsrecht, 1-5 (2018). 
33 n 37 below. 
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from better insurance conditions.34 There is no special provision on automated 
car is included in the text. We also have to consider and consider the fact that, at 
the end of 2017, Insurance Europe (the European insurance and reinsurance 
federation)35 has responded to the European Commission’s REFIT consultation 
on the Motor Insurance Directive (MID), which should be an essential tool in 
the protection of road traffic accident victims and should be preserved.36 
On 17 May 2018, the European Commission published a new 
communication,37 in which it focuses on the importance of non-personal data 
sharing while protecting cybersecurity and on the importance of fostering 
vehicle connectivity for automation.38 With regard to the safety on the roads 
and victims’ compensation, the European Commission affirms that the motor 
insurer can take actions against the manufacturer.39 
Automation also imposes the reshaping of rules on manufacturers’ liability, 
 
34 At point 7 the proposal for the Directive says that: ‘Effective and efficient protection of 
victims of traffic accidents requires that those victims are always reimbursed for their personal 
injuries or for damage to their property, irrespective of whether the insurance undertaking of 
the party liable is solvent or not. Member States should therefore set up or appoint a body that 
provides initial compensation for injured parties habitually residing within their territory, and 
which has the right to reclaim that compensation from the body set up or appointed for the same 
purpose in the Member State of establishment of the insurance undertaking which issued the 
policy of the vehicle of the liable party. However, to avoid parallel claims being introduced, victims 
of traffic incidents should not be allowed to present a claim for compensation with that body if 
they have already presented their claim or have taken legal action with the insurance undertaking 
concerned and that claim is still under consideration and that action is still pending’. 
35 See https://www.insuranceeurope.eu (last visited 10 January 2020). 
36 See https://tinyurl.com/ut3p37t (last visited 10 January 2020): Insurance Europe stressed 
that: ‘the MID is also fit for purpose for connected and autonomous vehicles. It added that these 
must not be excluded from the MID’s scope, as this would undermine the protection of road 
users. Insurance Europe noted that the success of the MID in achieving its goals is dependent 
on an open and competitive motor third party liability (MTPL) insurance market. As such, MTPL 
insurers must be able to exercise their commercial judgement freely. However, interferences - such 
as the standardization of claims history statements - would complicate MTPL insurers’ business 
without bringing real added value to European drivers. Given the increasing connectivity of 
vehicles, an open and competitive MTPL insurance market also requires rules to be in place at 
European level to ensure access to in-vehicle data is independent from vehicle manufacturers. 
This would ensure it is European drivers that decide who can access their data, and for what 
purposes’. 
37 European Commission, Communication On the Road to Automated Mobility: an EU 
Strategy for Mobility of the Future, COM(2018)283 final, available at https://tinyurl.com/v7y732r 
(last visited 10 January 2019). 
38 See A.C. Nazzaro, ‘Macchine intelligenti (smart cars): assicurazione e tutela della 
privacy’ Diritto del mercato assicurativo e finanziario, 60 (2018). 
39 n 37 above: ‘On the compensation of victims, the Motor Insurance Directive already 
provides for a quick compensation of victims including where an automated vehicle is involved. The 
insurer can then take legal action against a vehicle manufacturer under the Product Liability 
Directive if there is a malfunction/defect of the automated driving system. The European 
Commission just evaluated the Product Liability Directive and as a follow-up, it will issue an 
interpretative guidance clarifying important concepts in the Directive including in the light of 
technological developments’. 
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especially with regard to the concepts both of defect an of product.40 In 2018, 
the European Commission submitted the fifth report on the application of 
Directive on product liability. The Commission carried out a formal evaluation 
of the Directive, assessing whether the Directive continues to be an adequate 
tool and continues to meet its objectives today in the light of new technological 
developments. The Commission launched a public consultation on the evaluation 
of Directive on product liability in order to collect stakeholders’ feedback on the 
application and performance of the Directive, including considerations on 
challenges raised by new technological developments. 
As a result of this process, the Commission issued in 2019 guidance on the 
Directive on product liability, as well as a report on the broader implications for, 
potential gaps in and orientations for, the liability and safety frameworks for 
artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics. With regard to new 
technological challenges, the European Commission’s Report considers the 
following questions: Does the Directive adequately address the challenges of 
increasingly autonomous devices and cybersecurity? What about sustainability 
and reaching a circular economy? Does the Directive unnecessarily discourage 
producers from placing innovative products on the market? Or conversely, does 
it deter manufacturers from placing faulty and unsafe products on the market? 
Does it still protect injured persons in a changing world?41 
 
40 See https://tinyurl.com/wku9brt (last visited 10 January 2020). 
See K. Chagal, ‘Am I an Algorithm or a Product? When Products Liability Should Apply to 
Algorithmic Decision-Makers’ (2018), 27, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3130675 (last 
visited 10 January 2020). He proposes a new approach to distinguishing traditional products 
from ‘thinking algorithms’ for the determining whether products liability should apply. Instead 
of examining the vague concept of ‘autonomy’, the article analyzes the system's specific 
features and examines whether they promote or hinder the rationales behind the products 
liability legal framework. An algorithm that replaces human discretion cannot be considered a 
product, as information and services are not considered as to be products. At the same time 
damage caused by automation cannot be considered as to be ‘defect of the production’ when 
they are caused by a probability-based prediction. 
41 n 37 above. The Commission concluded affirming that: ‘The Directive has until now 
covered a broad range of products and technological developments. In principle, it is a useful 
tool for protecting injured persons and ensuring competition in the single market, by 
harmonizing rules for injured persons and businesses in the aspects that it covers. It is an area 
where EU level rules provide a clear added value. Having EU level rules for product liability is 
uncontested. This does not mean that the Directive is perfect. Its effectiveness is hampered by 
concepts (such as ‘product’, ‘producer’, ‘defect’, ‘damage’, or the burden of proof) that could be 
more effective in practice. As the evaluation has also shown, there are cases where costs are not 
equally distributed between consumers and producers. This is especially true when the burden 
of proof is complex, as may be the case with some emerging digital technologies or pharmaceutical 
products’. Technology is going to change the concept of a defective product but also the concept of 
production. As correctly underlined by the Commission: ‘Some of the concepts that were clear-
cut in 1985, such as ‘product’ and ‘producer’ or ‘defect’ and ‘damage’ are less so today. Industry 
is increasingly integrated into dispersed multi-actor and global value chains with strong service 
components. Products can increasingly be changed, adapted and refurbished beyond the producer’s 
control. They will also have increasing degrees of autonomy. Emerging business models disrupt 
traditional markets. The impact of these developments on product liability needs further reflection. 
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Some gaps of the Directive on product liability are underlined by this 
evaluation:42 
- The application of the Directive is problematic for products in which 
software and applications from different sources can be installed after purchase, 
that are connected to the Internet and can perform automated tasks based on 
algorithms and data analysis, automated tasks based on self-learning algorithms or 
shared with other users through collaborative platforms; 
- In case of damage caused by software, there could be a problem of proof. 
In case of open-source software used, for instance, in the medical field, it could 
be difficult to prove the damage resulting from a misdiagnosis due to a failure in 
the software; 
- In case of interconnected products correctly attributing liability for defects 
can be difficult; 
- A new concept of production is emerging. New technological developments 
such as 3D printers, which enable consumers to become manufacturers, could 
potentially undermine the attribution of the product that caused the damage; 
and 
- Typical technological damage also needs to be compensated. Let us think to 
service failures such as downtime or loss of data. 
This last point underscores the importance of considering product liability 
together with cybersecurity. 
The European Commission considers Artificial intelligence (AI) an area of 
strategic importance and a key driver of economic development. At the same 
time, the EC addressed socio-economic, legal and ethical impacts of the AI. It 
expressed in all its communication a European approach to Artificial Intelligence 
based on three pillars:43 
1. Being ahead of technological developments and encouraging uptake by 
the public and private sectors. The European Commission is increasing its 
annual investments ordered to connect and strengthen AI research centers 
across Europe. The European Commission supports the development of an ‘AI-
on-demand platform’ that will provide access to relevant AI resources in the EU 
for all users and supports the development of AI applications in key sectors. On 
10 April 2018, 25 European countries signed a Declaration of cooperation on 
Artificial Intelligence. It builds further on the achievements and investments of 
 
At the end of the day, a producer is and needs to be responsible for the product it puts into 
circulation, while injured persons need to be able to prove that damage has been caused by a 
defect. Both producers and consumers need to know what to expect from products in terms of 
safety through a clear safety Framework’. 
42 See https://tinyurl.com/u9p8qo4 (last visited 10 January 2020).  
43 See https://tinyurl.com/y7to5ws4 (last visited 10 January 2020). See also Report of the 
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy of 30 January 2019 on a comprehensive 
European Industrial Policy on Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (2018/2088(INI), available 
at https://tinyurl.com/sufqlac (last visited 10 January 2020). 
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the European research and business community in AI;44 
2. Preparing for socio-economic changes brought about by AI. The 
European Commission will support business-education partnerships to attract 
and keep more AI talent in Europe; it will set up dedicated training and 
retraining schemes for professionals; it will foresee changes in the labor market 
and skills mismatch; it will support digital skills and competences in science, 
technology, engineering, mathematics (STEM), entrepreneurship and 
creativity; and 
3. Ensuring an appropriate ethical and legal framework, the final ethics 
guidelines for trustworthy artificial intelligence prepared by the High-Level 
European Group on artificial intelligence were published on 8 April 2019. The 
European Commission will also develop and make available guidance on the 
interpretation of the product liability directive. 
These documents focus on new useful kinds of machine learning approach 
like the so called ‘reinforcement learning’. In this approach, the AI system is free 
to make its decisions over time, and at each decision point, we provide it with a 
reward signal that tells it whether it was a good or a bad decision. The goal of 
the system is to maximize the positive reward received. This approach is used, 
for example, in recommender system (such as the several online recommender 
systems that suggest users what they might like to buy), or also in marketing. 
Accordingly, at the end the group proposes a new definition of AI, which 
could improve the task and the liability of the manufacturer: 
‘Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are software (and possibly also 
hardware) systems designed by humans that, given a complex goal, act in 
the physical or digital dimension by perceiving their environment through 
data acquisition, interpreting the collected structured or unstructured data, 
reasoning on the knowledge, or processing the information, derived from 
this data and deciding the best action(s) to take to achieve the given goal. 
AI systems can either use symbolic rules or learn a numeric model, and 
they can also adapt their behavior by analyzing how the environment is 
affected by their previous actions. 
As a scientific discipline, AI includes several approaches and techniques, 
such as machine learning (of which deep learning and reinforcement 
learning are specific examples), machine reasoning (which includes planning, 
scheduling, knowledge representation and reasoning, search, and 
optimization), and robotics (which includes control, perception, sensors 
and actuators, as well as the integration of all other techniques into cyber-
physical systems)’. 
 
44 See https://tinyurl.com/y6wd9sud (last visited 10 January 2020). 
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The Commission’s Communication of 8 April 2019 sets out a human-
centric approach. AI is seen as a tool operating in the service of humanity and 
the public good, which aims to increase individual and collective human well-
being. Since people will only be able to confidently and fully reap the benefits of 
a technology that they can trust, AI’s trustworthiness must be ensured. With 
this Communication, the European Commission welcomes the publication of 
guidelines on AI. 
As noted above, AI HLEG presented a first draft of the guidelines in 
December of 2018. Following further deliberations by the group in light of 
discussions on the European AI alliance, a stakeholder consultation and 
meetings with representatives from Member States, the guidelines were revised 
and published in April 2019. 
Based on fundamental rights and ethical principles, the guidelines 
published in 2019 list seven key requirements that AI systems should meet in 
order to be trustworthy: 
• Human agency and oversight; 
• Technical robustness and safety; 
• Privacy and Data governance; 
• Transparency; 
• Diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; 
• Societal and environmental well-being; and 
• Accountability. 
 
 
VI. The Alternative Role of Insurance in Compensation and Prevention 
of Damage Caused by Automated Vehicles 
Even if the use of automated machines can cause damage, it represents an 
important risk reduction tool.45 At the same time, it is important to respond to 
the issue of compensation and prevention of damage caused by machines 
autonomously. 
Civil liability could be considered the basic instrument to prevent and 
compensate damage, but may not always be appropriate in cases of damage 
caused by AI if it is not possible to trace back damage to a responsible person. 
Scholars and legislators propose to reshape civil liability in case of intervention 
of automation. It is possible to propose a regulatory intervention that introduces 
strict liability of the user and/or of the owner of automated machines, where 
strict liability means a responsibility that does not give relevance neither to the 
guilt nor to the causal link between wrongdoing and losses, but such solution 
risks discouraging the use of automation. This consideration is valid not only 
 
45 R. Eastwood, T.P. Kelly, R.D. Alexander and E. Landre, ‘Towards a Safety Case for Runtime 
Risk and Uncertainty Management in Safety-Critical Systems’ System Safety Conference 
incorporating the Cyber Security Conference, 1–6 (2013). 
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with respect to road accidents where automation can reduce human errors. 
Many environments exist where automated work, also increasing quality and 
productivity, can be the solution to operations under hazardous conditions. 
Moreover, such solutions seem to not play any role in preventing damage caused 
by machines because the only way the owner and/or the user can reduce the 
risk of damage cause by machines operating in full automation is to not use the 
full automation. Civil liability therefore needs to be reshaped together with insurance. 
For example, the owner could be stimulated, from the fear of incurring 
responsibility, to subject the machine to an update and revision so that it is 
adequate to the best standards in terms of safety. However, we believe that it is 
preferable for the owner to be guided in the maintenance of the machine in order 
to make its operation as safe as possible. Moreover, the introduction of strict 
liability rule on the owner or on the user could discourage the use of AI in contrast 
with the common idea that AI represents an important instrument to reduce risks. 
In seeking a solution, perhaps we need to focus attention on the importance of 
compensation and prevention, which usually finds a solution in civil legal liability.  
We must say that, in the event of damage that can be referred to an 
automated machine, prevention will be more easily guaranteed by the collection 
of additional data relating to cases, in which defaults of the machine have been 
determined, in order to improve the state of knowledge and reduce damage for 
the future also thanks to the ‘reinforcement learning’.46 
It therefore appears that the goals of compensation and prevention are 
better achieved by a system that allows the compensation of the victim and at 
the same time the acquisition of data relating to the claims, their processing to 
provide new knowledge, manage the risks of defaults in the future and prevent 
damage. These functions can be performed by insurance companies that could, 
at the time of settlement of the claim, compensate the damage, acquire data and 
process them. These are activities that companies have already been carrying 
 
46 N. Bostrom, ‘When Machines Outsmart Humans’ 35 Futures, 759, 763 (2003). Artificial 
intelligence theorists use the term ‘singularity’ or ‘technical singularity’ to describe the moment 
in time, purely hypothetical at this point, when machines exceed human intelligence. He noted 
that it is not essential that the machine has the capacity to actually choose to break a ‘rule’; it is 
enough that the machine’s programming does not necessarily determine how the machine will 
act in all situations, leaving the machine to ‘learn’ how to make decisions when confronted with 
a situation not within the contemplation of the machine’s programmers. See B. Rossington, 
‘Robots Smarter Than Humans Within 15 Years. Predicts Google’s Artificial Intelligence Chief’ 
Mirror News (2 February 2014), available at https://tinyurl.com/w8ympsq (last visited 10 January 
2020). See Recommendations to the European Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
(2015/2103(INL)). As said, the Commission stressed on this point: ‘the more autonomous robots 
are, the less they can be considered to be simple tools in the hands of other actors (such as the 
manufacturer, the operator, the owner, the user, etc); whereas this, in turn, questions whether 
the ordinary rules on liability are sufficient or whether it calls for new principles and rules to 
provide clarity on the legal liability of various actors concerning responsibility for the acts and 
omissions of robots where the cause cannot be traced back to a specific human actor and 
whether the acts or omissions of robots which have caused harm could have been avoided’. 
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out creating knowledge in risk management. The insurers can use the knowledge 
acquired to give instructions to the insured in order to make safer and safer the 
insured automated systems. Insurance contracts can create and update standards 
and guidelines, and include special conditions providing the exclusion of coverage 
if the insured automated system is not complaint with the standards and the 
guidelines. All this does not mean completely overcoming the hypotheses of 
civil liability and creating a completely no-fault system.47 We believe that civil 
liability can still play a relevant role in the artificial intelligence system, provided 
that, as noted by the doctrine,48 the concepts on which the cases of civil 
responsibility are based are innovated: negligence, the defect in production, the 
duty not to harm. 
As noted above, a first solution could be to establish by law that the owner 
is always liable if he/she accepts to use automation losing the control of the 
machine. The legislator should also provide for a mandatory insurance for the 
owner, in all cases of automation and not only in case of automated cars. 
Moreover, the additional value of insurance in case of risks related to 
automation is that the insurer can create and update standards and guidelines 
and include in insurance contracts special conditions providing the exclusion of 
coverage if the automated system is not compliant with those standards and the 
guidelines that are under the control of the owner. It is also possible, in order to 
preserve the interest of the victims to be compensated, to provide for the 
indemnification of the victim. Even in case of damage caused by the automated 
machines that is working in a way that is not compliant with the standards and 
the guidelines imposed by contract by the insurers who, will have the right to 
subrogation/regress against the owner/insured). This means that the exclusion 
 
47 On strict liability, D.C. Vladeck, ‘Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and 
Artificial Intelligence’, 89 Washington Law Review, 117, 146 (2014): ‘My proposal is to 
construct a system of strict liability, completely uncoupled from notions of fault for this select 
group of cases. A strict liability regime cannot be based here on the argument that the vehicles 
are ’ultra-hazardous’ or ‘unreasonably risky’ for the simple reason that driver-less vehicles are 
likely to be far less hazardous or risky than the products they replace. Indeed, it is precisely 
because these machines are so technologically advanced that we expect them not to fail. For 
these reasons, a true strict liability regime will be needed; one that does not resort to a risk-
utility test or the re-institution of a negligence standard for the simple fact that those tests will 
be difficult, if not impossible, for the injured party to overcome’. The Author says also that: 
‘Lest there be any doubt, my argument is not based on notions of a ‘no-fault’ liability system, 
that is, a system that substitutes mandatory insurance and eliminates access to the judicial 
system. My proposal is a strict liability regime implemented by the courts. Although the idea of 
‘no fault’ systems took hold in the 1970s and 1980s, and was expected to drive down insurance 
costs by limiting the transaction costs related to litigation, it is by now apparent that those 
systems have not worked as envisioned. It is likely, however, that the introduction of driverless 
cars will shift liability from the ‘driver’ to the manufacturer, and that shift may trigger a 
resurgence of interest in ‘no fault’ insurance regimes’ (fn 91). See, eg, J.M. Anderson et al, The 
US Experience with No Fault Automobile Insurance: a Retrospective (Santa Monica: The 
RAND Corporation, 2010). 
48 nn 8-9 above.  
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by contract will operate against the insured and not against the victim. In these 
terms, insurance can represent a level and a guide to the correct maintenance of 
the machine according to the best safety conditions. In this way, however, we 
create a disincentive to the use of automation, which will be burdened by 
insurance premium. While the automation, as said, can contribute significantly 
in reducing accidents. 
Another solution could be the creation of a public fund to compensate 
victims of full automation like in case of guarantee funds for road accidents 
victims introduced by the Directive 84/5/CEE Art 1 para 4. The public fund could 
delegate to insurance companies the management of accidents (assessment and 
compensation). The designated insurance company would compensate the victim 
and it will be reimbursed by the public fund that could be financed by the producers, 
assuming that they are receiving the most part of economic advantages from 
production of automated machines. Moreover, we have to point out the role that 
producer can play in achieving high standard of products’ safety and in maintaining 
such level of safety by recalling back products that need to be updated. 
In this case, the task to create and update standards and guidelines could 
be over the Fund together with the delegated insurance companies. The machine 
algorithms will need to be updated to those standards and guidelines. In order 
to leave the liability on the wrongdoer and compensate the victim, it could be 
possible to establish, in the statute regulating the fund, that the victim, after 
being compensate will subrogate the fund in her/his rights against the wrongdoer 
who could be the producer, the owner, the user also in case of omission in 
updating the machine. 
In this way the goals of compensation and prevention are reached without 
discouraging the full automation. 
The interaction between human beings and machines with regard to 
automation of course will not only reshape civil liability but also insurance. As 
noted above  
‘we soon realize, however, that the insurance of the civil liability can 
play much broader functions than those limited to the interest of any 
responsible person. We soon realize that if the concept of liability has led 
and developed the liability insurance, this has certainly contributed to the 
further opening of the first, so as to represent more than a vicious circle, an 
upward spiral in the progress of the law. And we realize also that the function 
cannot be limited to the protection of the tortfeasor’s exclusive interest, but 
it is necessary to expand the protection of the real victim, the injured third 
party’.49 
 
49 A. Donati, Trattato del diritto delle assicurazioni private. Il diritto del contratto di 
assicurazione, La disciplina delle singole specie (rami) di assicurazione (Milano: Giuffrè, 
1956), III, II, 329. 
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VII. Conclusions 
Automated choices, as discussed throughout this paper, can reduce the risk 
of accidents, but some damages are not avoidable. As stressed in some cases the 
cause of damage cannot be traced back to a specific human actor. 
Given such a scenario, it is important to compensate the victims. So far, the 
European Commission has focused particularly on driving automated vehicles 
and underlined the importance of coordinating the responsibility of the user, of 
the owner and of the manufacturer. However, it is absolutely imperative that we 
also consider the different levels of automation and human-machine interaction 
for the purpose of proof of causal link. In case of automation, the network of 
actors in the process determining the damage is so complex that it could be 
difficult to determine what’s the cause of the damage. Could it be the use of the 
machine? A defect of the machine? A defect of the algorithms? When putting 
strict liability on the owner of the machine or on the producer and improving 
the level of diligence on the actors, it is important to determine causation that is 
something different from the guilt in the wrongdoing.50 
In case of full automation, if the action or omission of the machine does not 
refer to any human actions or omissions we conclude that, with regards to the 
proceeding of causation, we are in the presence of an irresistible force that is 
neither imputable to the user, the owner, or the manufacturer. We have therefore 
evaluated two possible solutions: a) either an attempt to find another way to 
compensate victims, ie a way different from civil liability (eg through public 
funds),51 or via a specific mandatory insurance for owners of automated machines); 
or b) the regulation of the use of full automated choices leaving always the final 
choice, and together with it the liability, to the user who must maintain the control. 
As noted above, the EU Law considers automation under different perspectives. 
First, in May 2018, the European Commission presented a proposal to amend 
the motor insurance directive. That proposal stressed the importance of victims’ 
compensation, but is does not contain any specific norms regarding automated 
vehicles.52 Secondly, some gaps in EU law have been underscored by the 
 
50 See V. Tadros, ‘Causation, Culpability, and Liability’, in C. Coons and M. Weber eds, 
Ethics of self-defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chapter 6. About the problem of 
‘multi-agents’ in case of automation, see G. Teubner, ‘Digitale Rechtssubjekte? Zum privatrechtlichen 
Status automoner Softwareagenten’ 218 Archiv fuer die civilistische Praxis, 155 (2018) and Id, 
Soggetti giuridici digitali? Sullo status privatistico degli agenti software antonomi (Napoli: 
Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2019), 120, stressing the importance to determine a financial 
entity able to compensate victims. 
51 As said (n 44 above), also in this case thanks to a fruitful discussion with Professor 
Fuglinszky, the State could be considered liable as it approved guidelines and conditions for the 
use of automation. Professor Fuglinzski stressed on the following points with regard to 
automated cars: administrative law allows AVs to take part in normal traffic, so there is an 
explicit permission given by administrative law; the software is preprogrammed according to 
the applicable ethical guidelines in the country. 
52 M. Channon, ‘Autonomous Vehicles and Legal Effects: Some Considerations on Liability 
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evaluation of the directive on product liability, which considers the approximation 
of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products. The evaluation report also considers 
typical technological damage that needs to be compensated, for instance service 
failures such as downtime or loss of data. Thirdly, on 17 May 2018 the European 
Commission published a communication where connections between product 
liability and cyber liability are underlined. Fourthly, the European Parliament’s 
resolution of 16 February 2017 proposes a form of strict liability of users or 
owners of robots. We can underline three different objectives in the above-
mentioned interventions: i) the protection of road victims in general; ii) the 
protection of consumers in case of defective product; and iii) cybersecurity. 
We also note the existence of different interventions regarding different 
matters. The complexity of reality imposes a greater dialogue between different 
normative areas and a greater need for an interdisciplinary approach, even in 
the production of norms. Hence, only by considering the different disciplinary 
fields, it will be possible to arrive at regulatory innovations that reflect the 
multiformity of reality and contain tools to respond to the problems that such a 
complex reality poses. 
From the analysis of the interventions at the level of EU legislation, there is 
a certain lack of communication between the various regulatory areas. Protection 
of road victims, data protection in cyberspace and producer responsibility are 
strongly correlated in reality. These are regulations that must be constructed as 
‘communicating vessels’ and not as closed and self-referential areas. The 
national legislator and the community legislator must recover a vision that is 
close to the problem and at the same time coherent with the general framework 
of value, principles and social instances. 
While we are analyzing in-depth the individual problems that the topic 
poses, we must not lose sight of the general framework of the principles that 
inform civil liability. The compensation of victims cannot be solved by 
eliminating obstacles to the operation of civil liability without considering the 
repercussions that such solutions can have on the functions of compensation 
and prevention of damages. Moreover, are we sure that in case of damage 
caused by a machine running in full automation civil liability can prevent 
 
Issues’ [according to my research: Conference: AIDA Motor Insurance Working Party Paris 
(instead of DIMAF), 33 (2015)]. He underlines regarding EU law that: ‘It is submitted that an 
overall EU wide approach is needed for autonomous vehicles and this should be considered as 
soon as possible. The Motor Insurance Directives have sought to remove any barriers to trade 
by harmonizing key aspects of the law of Motor Insurance to protect free movement. Differing 
laws on autonomous insurance and liability will almost certainly constitute a significant barrier 
to movement as Member States will almost certainly introduce differing laws and regulations 
and will almost certainly answer the above questions in relation to liability in different ways’. 
See also N. Bevan et al, ‘University of Exeter – Written evidence (AUV0044), Driverless vehicles – 
where are we going wrong?’ Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: The Future? (2017) House 
of Lords Report, available at https://tinyurl.com/s27e8lu (last visited 10 January 2020). 
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damage thanks its deterrence function?  
The insurers, covering the liability of the owner or of the producer or acting 
as delegate of public funds in compensating damages to victims of AI can create 
and update standards and guidelines in order to ‘educate’ machines with a 
relevant role in prevention of damage caused by AI thanks to tools like the 
‘reinforcement learning’ concerning with how software agents can take actions 
in an environment so as to maximize some forms of cumulative reward. 
 
